Economic Anxiety or Racial Predispositions? Explaining White Support for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election by Riley III, Emmitt Y. & Peterson, Clarissa
DePauw University 
Scholarly and Creative Work from DePauw University 
Political Science Faculty publications Political Science 
2018 
Economic Anxiety or Racial Predispositions? Explaining White 
Support for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election 
Emmitt Y. Riley III 
DePauw University, emmittriley@depauw.edu 
Clarissa Peterson 
DePauw University, cpeterson@depauw.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.depauw.edu/politicalscience_facpubs 
 Part of the American Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Article added with permission of publisher. Article originally published in: Riley III, Emmitt Y. and Clarissa 
Peterson, "Economic Anxiety or Racial Predispositions? Explaining White Support for Donald Trump in the 
2016 Presidential Election," Journal of Race & Policy 14, no.1 (2018): 5-24. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at Scholarly and Creative Work from 
DePauw University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty publications by an authorized 
administrator of Scholarly and Creative Work from DePauw University. For more information, please contact 
bcox@depauw.edu. 
Emmitt Y. Riley III  & Clarissa Peterson 5
Economic Anxiety or Racial Predispositions? 
Explaining White Support for Donald Trump 
in the 2016 Presidential Election 




In this article, we examine the degree to which White support for Donald Trump is driven by economic 
anxiety or racial resentment. Given Donald Trump’s rhetoric surrounding racial and ethnic minorities during the 
2016 presidential election, it is perplexing that the influence of racial attitudes has been ignored in explaining his 
electoral success. We argue that Whites with high levels of racially resentful attitudes should be more likely to sup-
port Donald Trump and that racial resentment should be a greater determinant of support for Trump than variables 
measuring economic anxiety. Relying on a logistic regression analysis, we utilize data from the 2016 American 
National Elections Survey. The findings support our expectations: White respondents with high levels of racially 
resentful attitudes were significantly more likely to indicate support for Donald Trump. Additionally, the model 
demonstrates that racial resentment is a far greater predictor of White support for Donald Trump than measures 
that capture economic anxiety. 
Keywords: Racial Resentment, Economic Anxiety, Presidential Election
INTRODUCTION
Is White support for Donald Trump driven by racial resentment or concerns about the U.S. economy? The driving factors behind racially resentful attitudes have been subject 
to extensive debate among scholars. There is a substantial body of scholarship that has found 
empirical links between racial resentment and opposition to race-targeted policies such as af-
firmative action, the American Affordable Healthcare Act, African American candidates, and 
its spillover into mass public opinion (Knuckey, 2011; Tesler, 2012a and 2012b; Maxwell et 
al., 2013; Wilson and King-Meadows, 2016).
A number of studies examining the role of racial resentment during the Obama presidency 
show that the Obama presidency brought in a political era in which racial attitudes spilled over 
into mass public opinion on a host of issues that were not even directly related to race, making 
the political environment ripe for the influence of racial attitudes (Tesler, 2015). According 
to these studies, the impact of racial attitudes has spilled over into (1) Whites’ evaluation of 
political leaders (e.g. Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden) that have been associated with Barack 
Obama (ANES 2016 Pilot Study, 2016); (2) partisan attachments (Tesler, 2013 and 2015); (3) 
Obama’s legislative agenda (Knoll and Shewmaker, 2014); (4) the voting behavior of Whites in 
congressional districts where House members supported Obamacare (Tesler, 2013); (5) assess-
ments of the U.S. economy (Chen et al., 2014) and (6) even attitudes towards the president’s 
water poodle (Tesler, 2012b). The implications of these studies suggest that the political envi-
ronment in a post-Obama America may be significantly more susceptible to the influence of 
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racial attitudes for years to come.
While the presence of racially resentful attitudes has been extensively documented, there 
has been extensive debate about what these attitudes mean, how to interpret these attitudes, 
and factors driving the re-emergence of racial resentment. Scholars engaging in this debate 
usually fall into two schools of thought. On the one hand, there is a group of scholars who 
contend that racial resentment is not rooted in racism and is instead a manifestation of prin-
cipled politics (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Sniderman et al., 2000). Scholars embracing 
this approach argue that race-targeted policies violate fundamental American values such as 
individualism, leading many Whites to oppose such programs. Under this view, Whites oppose 
policies such as affirmative action not because of racism or prejudice but because these policies 
represent an ideological violation of their core political values. On the other hand, there are 
scholars who contend that Whites’ opposition to race-targeted policies are a direct function 
of racial prejudice and are not linked to ideological considerations (Kinder and Mendelberg, 
2000; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sidanius et al., 1996; Jackman, 1994; Sidanius and Pratto, 
1999). Some scholars even suggest that “ideology itself has become entwined with racial preju-
dice so that a racially tinged form of individualism now fuels opposition to racial programs to 
a far greater extent than opposition to other government efforts to assist the poor” (Feldman 
and Huddy, 2005, 168). 
The 2016 presidential election presents a significant opportunity to investigate the degree 
to which racial resentment may have spillover into the U.S. presidential election. Specifically, 
this election allows us to investigate factors driving White support for Donald Trump empiri-
cally. In the aftermath of the 2016 election, many leaders from both Democratic and Repub-
lican parties, political commentators, and analysts suggested that Hillary Clinton failed to ad-
vance a message that spoke to the economic anxiety of White working-class voters in areas such 
as the Midwest. Proponents of this line of reasoning contend that with the rampant expansion 
of technology and globalization, many Whites in rural areas of the United States felt forgot-
ten due to the closing of several industries which resulted in the loss of jobs, wages, and their 
overall well-being. What is perplexing about this assessment is that it diminishes the role that 
race and racial predispositions played in the election. Unlike previous Republican candidates, 
Donald Trump engaged in one of the most racially divisive campaigns in modern U.S. history. 
Many of Donald Trump’s actions were explicit racial appeals. His rise to political prominence 
came when he advanced the racist “birther” claim, which essentially questioned the legitimacy 
of America’s first African American President. On June 16, 2015, he sent shock waves across 
the nation by arguing that Mexican immigrants were “drug dealers” and “rapists.” During the 
course of the campaign, Donald Trump claimed that Judge Gonzalo Curiel, who was born in 
the United States, was incapable of being fair to him because of the judge’s Mexican heritage. 
On the eve of the southern Republican presidential primaries, Donald Trump refused to un-
equivocally disavow David Duke, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan. He even called for a 
complete travel ban on Muslims to prevent them from entering the United States. In addition 
to making explicit racial appeals, he also engaged in implicit appeals by declaring himself the 
“law and order” candidate. These tactics employed by then-candidate Donald Trump raise the 
question: to what degree was his White support driven by economic anxiety among a segment 
of voters who felt forgotten, or was his support driven by racial predispositions? 
In the days following Donald Trump’s election, White Supremacists and anti-Semitic 
groups celebrated his victory. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, there were sig-
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nificant increases in incidents that involved hate crimes targeting racial and religious minorities 
following Trump’s election. Trump’s movements between explicit and implicit racial appeals, 
in addition to the narrative suggesting that much of his support among White voters was be-
cause of economic anxiety, present an ideal opportunity to empirically investigate the degree to 
which racial predispositions motivated his support. While the narrative that many of Trump’s 
supporters were worried about the economy has been given much credence, it is essential that 
this particular narrative is placed within the proper context of the facts. According to the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, when President Obama took office in 2009, the unemployment rate 
was 7.8 percent, compared to 4.7 percent when Donald Trump took office. There is a well-
documented body of research which suggesting that Barack Obama’s candidacy and presidency 
activated strong levels of racial resentment among White voters. If, as the empirical record 
demonstrates, Barack Obama in fact activated strong levels of racial resentment among White 
voters (see, for example, Peterson and Riley, 2017), and he did not even overtly take on issues 
of race, then it is plausible that Donald Trump’s racially divisive rhetoric could have mobilized 
racially resentful Whites in a political environment already ripe for racial resentment. Provid-
ing some level of support for this assertion, the experimental study by Luttig et al., (2017,1) 
finds that “White Trump supporters randomly exposed to a Black man in the context of so-
liciting their support for housing assistance policy were more opposed to the policy, angrier 
about the policy, and more likely to blame the beneficiaries for their situation.” Although this 
study does show that White support for Donald Trump is highly linked to racial animosity, 
the study does not give serious consideration to the role of economic anxiety. For example, the 
researchers control for individual unemployment, but they do not control for the participants’ 
individual assessments of their economic status or the national economy as a whole.
This article unfolds as follows. First, we review the relevant literature concerning racial 
resentment, racial appeals, and economic voting. Second, we present our data and method-
ological approach used for addressing the research question. Finally, we present the findings 
and conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings and where this study fits 
within the literature.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Racial Resentment and Vote Choice
Both racial resentment and economic voting have been subject to extensive research with-
in the literature that investigates determinants of vote choice. An inquiry into the academic 
literature provides a theoretical justification for the explanation that Donald Trump’s White 
support could have been influenced by racial resentment or concerns about the economy. 
There is a well-documented body of literature that examines the relationship between opposi-
tion to African American candidates and racial resentment (Orey, 2001; Knuckey, 2012; Max-
well et al., 2013). What scholars have found is that strong levels of racially resentful attitudes 
are significant predictors of both evaluations of African American politicians and vote choice 
among Whites. Although political scientists have engaged in extensive research on the degree 
to which racially resentful attitudes impact African American candidates, what is unclear is the 
extent to which racial resentment functions when there are two White candidates on the ballot. 
Studying this relationship is especially important given that one of the major party candidates 
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engaged in explicit racial appeals, and the other candidate supported ethnic and racial minori-
ties in the campaign.
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 was interpreted by many as one of the greatest po-
litical upsets in modern political history. Even though preliminary polling data indicated that 
Trump supporters held strong negative racial attitudes, many suggested the Democratic candi-
date Hillary Clinton failed to advance a message that spoke to the economic concerns of White 
working-class voters. In describing Donald Trump’s electoral victory, CNN Commentator Van 
Jones said, “This was a White-lash against a changing country… It was White-lash against a 
Black president in part. And that’s the part where the pain comes.” Jones was describing what 
many empirical studies have found: that at both the national and regional levels, racial resent-
ment has primed Whites’ reaction to Barack Obama (Ford et al., 2010). Similarly, other studies 
show that racial resentment had a more significant influence on vote choice in 2008 than in 
any previous election (Kam and Kinder, 2012; Knuckey, 2011; Tesler and Sears, 2010a). 
It is not unreasonable to expect that racial attitudes exerted a significant influence on vote 
choice in the 2016 presidential election, given the nation’s troubled history with race and how 
these negative racial attitudes had implicitly been primed in prior presidential elections. The 
racial resentment thesis is predicated on the notion that older forms of racism such as overt 
racism (i.e., Jim Crow) have evolved into a new form, known as racial resentment. Although 
Jim Crow rests on the idea that Blacks are morally inferior and are therefore not worthy of 
sharing the same public facilities and residential areas, racial resentment is based on “a blend 
of anti-Black effect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Prot-
estant Ethic” (Kinder and Sears, 1981, 416). Racial resentment contends that prejudice in 
the evaluation of Black candidates stems from the denial of the continued struggle for equal-
ity among African Americans, and that African Americans are demanding undeserved favors 
from the government (Henry and Sears, 2002; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Kinder and Sears, 
1981; McConahay and Hough, 1976). The opposition from Whites who are racially resentful 
rests in symbolic racism rather than a real threat to White political interest (Henry and Sears, 
2002). Sears asserts that racial resentment is “a mixture of anti-Black feelings with the finest 
and proudest of traditional American values, particularly individualism” (1988, 54).
Kinder and Sears first introduced the framework of symbolic racism in a 1981 study that 
investigated the impact of White racial attitudes on vote choice in the Los Angeles mayoral 
election of 1969. They argue that symbolic racism is developed early in life, and stems from 
negative ideas toward African Americans intersecting with conservatism (Kinder and Sears, 
1981). Additionally, several studies have found that symbolic racism is a strong predictor of 
White opposition to Black candidates and is indirectly related to nonracial issues such as wel-
fare, busing, and crime (Peffley and Hurwitz, 2007). 
Scholars have linked the emergence of racial resentment to two primary issues: race riots in 
the 1960s, and African American demands for formal equality (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Po-
litical elites such as Richard Nixon, George Wallace, and Ronald Reagan primed racial resent-
ment with their racially subtle rhetoric that suggested African American failure was not a result 
of the lasting legacy of White Supremacy, but was instead a result of African American failure 
to take advantage of opportunities. According to Kinder and Sanders “a new form of prejudice 
has come to prominence… at its center are the contentions that Blacks do not try hard enough 
to overcome difficulties they face, and they take what they have not earned. Today, we say, 
prejudice is expressed in the language of American individualism” (1996, 105–106).
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In essence, racial resentment is nothing more than a politically correct way of expressing 
racial prejudice (McConahay and Hough, 1976). Kinder and Sanders support that racial re-
sentment “is not an automatic part of American political discourse or public opinion… How 
deeply resentment infiltrates our policies depends importantly on decision made by elites” 
(1996, 258). For example, political leaders must prime racial resentment with racial appeals 
through campaigns, advertisements, speeches, etc., in order to influence voting decisions 
(Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002).
Tali Mendelberg (2001) offers one of the most comprehensive theories of racial appeals in 
political campaigns. She asserts that “racial messages are communicated most effectively when 
no one notices its racial meaning” (4). Simply put, she contends that effective racial appeals 
must be implicit. Mendelberg states: 
politicians convey racial messages implicitly when two contradictory 
conditions hold: (1) they wish to avoid violating the norm of racial 
equality, and (2) they face incentives to mobilize racially resentful 
White voters. White voters respond to implicitly racial messages 
when two contradictory conditions hold: (1) they wish to adhere 
to the norm of racial equality, and (2) they resent Blacks’ claims for 
public resources and hold negative racial stereotypes regarding work, 
violence, and sexuality. (2001, 6–7)
Although the 2016 presidential election did not feature the presence of an African Ameri-
can as a candidate, one could very well argue that the political environment was ripe for the 
influence of racial resentment on vote choice. Consider the fact that scholars such as Michael 
Tesler have empirically demonstrated that 
mass politics had become more polarized by racial attitude since 
Barack Obama’s rise to prominence. That is, the election of Presi-
dent Obama helped usher in a “most racial” political era where ra-
cially liberals and conservative Americans were more divided over 
a whole host of political positions than they had been in modern 
times. (2016, 3)
Similar to the riots of the 1960s that led to the rise of racial resentment, it is conceivable 
to think that the rise of mass protests over the killing of several unarmed Black men would 
spark resentment among some segments of the White community. While Barack Obama was 
not a presidential candidate in the 2016 presidential election, in many ways Hillary Clinton 
represented an expanded version of Obama’s incumbency. She ran her campaign on “Stronger 
Together,” vowing to dismantle the legacy of racial and economic inequality. She openly stated 
that Black lives matter. It could very well be argued that both her association with Barack 
Obama and her endorsement of his health care policy could have caused Hillary Clinton to be 
racialized in the eyes of White Americans. 
Even though Tali Mendelberg (2001) offers one of the most comprehensive theories of 
racial appeals, her theory is not applicable to Donald Trump because she assumes that racial ap-
peals only work if the candidate is concerned about violating the norms of racial equality. But 
what happens when political elites do not care about breaking the norms of racial equality and 
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rail against political correctness to justify their objectively racist actions? In the case of Donald 
Trump, he vigorously used his campaign platform to engage in objectively bigoted statements, 
and when the media attempted to hold him accountable, he discredited the press for being 
politically correct. Research indicates that political elites have often primed racial attitudes 
and that political elites often send cues to the masses by taking specific positions (Valentino, 
1999). We assert that Donald Trump’s constant racially charged rhetoric may have strategically 
mobilized White voters with racially resentful attitudes in a political environment already ripe 
for racial resentment.
Economic Anxiety and Voting
The idea that economic concerns rather than racial resentment may drive White support 
for Donald Trump is not unreasonable given the historical influence of the economy in presi-
dential elections. The expansion of globalization, technology, and policies such as NAFTA have 
resulted in the closing of a number of industrial plants and factories, leaving many Americans 
without jobs or forcing them into low-paying jobs. A central factor that has received extensive 
attention within the political science literature is the extent to which national economic con-
ditions impact voters’ decisions in U.S. elections (Erikson, 1990; Kiewiet and Rivers, 1985; 
Fair, 1978; Tufte, 1978). As strategic actors, voters use many different indicators to make as-
sessments about the performance of the U.S. economy, and either reward or punish the party 
in power. Scholars generally agree that voters do give consideration to the national economy; 
however, the exact factors that voters give attention to have been subject to much debate.
An assessment of the academic literature uncovers both the relationship between the health 
of the national economy, vote choice, political participation, and measures that scholars use to 
gauge economic anxiety. Some of the early empirical inquiries that have used aggregate data 
demonstrate that the conditions of the national economy are significant predictors of electoral 
outcomes in presidential elections (Fair, 1978; Tufte, 1978; Hibbs, 1987). Similarly, studies 
relying on survey data have found that voters give more consideration to micro-level factors 
such as family income, unemployment, and individual assessments of the overall economy 
and their economic well-being when making judgments about the national economy. Under 
these circumstances, voters often reward the incumbent party when their finances are sound 
and punish them when they are bad (Fiorina, 1978; Kiewiet, 1983; Markus, 1988). One of 
the critical areas that scholars have challenged is whether or not variables such as GDP and 
per capita income growth are useful for gauging voters’ perception of economic performance. 
Scholars raising this point suggest that individual voters might not be sophisticated enough to 
understand the complexities of variables such as the GDP and per capita income growth, and 
instead may use a wide variety of economic indicators such as income, employment status, and 
concerns about the stability of the market to make judgments about the national economy 
(Erikson, 2001).
Investigating the role of economic anxiety in the 2016 presidential election requires a 
critical assessment of proxies that tap into economic anxiety. Because there are no standard or 
consistent measures of economic anxiety, it is essential that clear distinctions are made between 
economic hardships and economic anxiety. While economic hardship and economic anxiety 
are similar, financial hardships reflect an individual’s current economic situation, such as earn-
ings, employment status, poverty, and foreclosures. Economic anxiety, on the other hand, 
reflects an individual’s concern or worries about future prospects, such as potential layoffs, sav-
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ings, economic recessions, and the future stability of the overall economy. Measuring economic 
anxiety requires an examination of not just unemployment or income, but also an individual’s 
assessment and perception of the economy as a whole. 
Now that we have discussed economic anxiety it is important to examine how anxiety 
impacts human behavior. Psychology literature provides insights on how anxiety affects hu-
man behavior and emotions. Some studies show that anxiety has a negative impact on cogni-
tion because it causes one to give greater attention to stimuli that reinforce a perceived threat 
(Eysenck, 1992.) Others have also found that anxiety results in a person perceiving a higher 
likelihood of risk. Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) find that anxiety produces a strong sense 
of uncertainty. Schaller et al. (2003) found that anxiety increases the likelihood of stereotype 
activation. The psychological effects of anxiety hold significant consequences for human be-
havior, and it is not unreasonable to contend that these consequences are likely to influence an 
individual’s political behavior and attitudes. 
The 2016 presidential election presents an ideal opportunity to examine the role of racial 
resentment and economic anxiety on vote choice. Despite significant improvements in the 
national economy, Donald Trump used his campaign to discredit the truthfulness of the U.S. 
economic performance indicators. For example, when the U.S. Department of Labor released a 
report indicating that overall unemployment had decreased to 4.9 percent and that the median 
income in the U.S had increased by 5.2 percent, Donald Trump called the numbers “phony” 
and “disastrous.” By several indicators, the national economy was performing relatively well 
during the course of the 2016 presidential election, yet despite these facts, Donald Trump 
cast doubt over the accuracy of the economy’s performance. Given that past empirical studies 
have indicated voters may not understand the complexities of national economic measures, it 
becomes even more important to rely on individual voters’ assessments of their own economic 
status when making assessments about the economy. 
HYPOTHESES
We will investigate two main hypotheses to determine the relative impact of economic 
anxiety and racial resentment on voter support for Donald Trump.
H1: Respondents with higher levels of racial resentment are more likely to support Donald 
Trump.
H2: Racial resentment is a greater determinant of the vote for Donald Trump than eco-
nomic anxiety.
DATA AND METHODS
The data for this empirical analysis were taken from the American National Election Stud-
ies Survey (ANES) with a pre-election survey administered during September and November 
2016, and a post-election survey administered to as many of the same respondents as possible 
in November 2016 and January 2017. Researchers used both face-to-face interviews and the 
internet to survey respondents. These data collection methods yielded a total sample size of 
4,271 with 1,181 via face-to-face interviews and 3,090 via the internet. Because we are in-
terested in explaining White support for Donald Trump, we restrict our statistical analysis to 
White respondents, which include 3,038 respondents.
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Who are Trump Supporters? 
Describing Trump supporters paints a picture of those who may feel marginalized, but 
who also have troubling racial preconceptions. Respondents who supported Trump were less 
educated, more likely to be conservative, and more likely to be Republican than those who 
did not support Trump. In order to get a more complete picture of Trump supporters, Table 
1 shows the percentage of people who voted for Donald Trump across a number of categories 
including gender, party, ideology, and race. The percentages indicate the percentage of people 
within that category who said they supported Donald Trump. While this descriptive informa-
tion does not address the hypotheses, it does allow us to have a better idea of the typical Trump 
supporter. As shown in Table 1, an overwhelming 81 percent of conservative respondents indi-
cated they supported or planned to support Donald Trump in the general election. As expect-
ed, Republicans seemed to be loyal in the 2016 election, as they have been in other elections. 
In fact, 85 percent of those who identified as Republican also supported the election of Donald 
Trump. Conservatives and Republicans overwhelmingly supported the Republican candidate.







Mean Income Category $55,000–$59,000
Unemployment anxiety 32%
Economy Anxiety 56%
The 2016 year was unique for many reasons. One of the most profound, and perhaps 
disturbing, critiques of this election was Donald Trump’s alleged treatment of women and 
minority groups. While female opponents, critics, and journalists were often denigrated by 
candidate Trump, many believed women would reject his candidacy to vote for the woman 
candidate, Hillary Clinton, instead. After the election, it was surprising to learn that many 
women supported Donald Trump in spite of his recorded comments about grabbing women. 
Although Table 1 shows women are less likely than men (40% to 47%) to support Trump, 
this percentage represents a much larger number than many would have expected given the 
controversial candidate’s comments. At the least, this reality challenges the presumption that 
women will reject a candidate who is painted as sexist. The same can be said for those who were 
non-White. Twenty percent of non-White respondents supported Donald Trump despite his 
position on a Muslim ban, reference to Mexican rapists and building a wall, and his claim that 
Blacks are living in hell. While this 20 percent is much less than the 44 percent that Trump 
received overall, it suggests that many non-Whites may have been willing to overlook Trump’s 
missteps when making their decision in the election of 2016.
Although family income does not measure economic anxiety, it is still useful for describing 
those most attracted to Donald Trump. The family income of Trump supporters is between 
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$55,000 and $59,999. The average family income for Trump supporters is slightly higher than 
the family income for others, but the means are not statistically different from each other. This 
economic indicator does not help us much when gauging the economic anxiety people may 
have had that caused them to be attracted to Trump. In fact, there does not seem to be a big 
difference between respondents who supported Trump and respondents who did not support 
Trump. More rigorous analysis is necessary to discern the importance of economic variables in 
explaining support for Donald Trump. Economic variables such as family income are helpful, 
but they do not capture the perceptions people have regarding the economy. In other words, it 
is very likely, in fact probable, that people will have perceptions that do not reflect their own 
reality. To address economic perceptions, we measure respondents’ assessment of the economy 
by the question, “How about people out of work during the coming 12 months? Do you think 
there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?” and their perceptions of 
the economy as a whole by the question, “What about the next 12 months? Do you expect the 
economy, in the country as a whole, to get better, stay about the same, or get worse?” Both of 
these measures require respondents to assess their beliefs about the future economy, which we 
believe exposes their anxiety. Table 1 indicates that when looking at individual perceptions of 
the economy, about a third (32%) support Trump. Only a small portion of those who may see 
themselves economically doing worse in the future support Trump. At the same time, a little 
more than half of those who have negative perceptions about the national economy supported 
him. Regardless of the state of the economy, people who hold economic anxiety may penalize 
the incumbent party, as suggested by previous scholars (Erikson, 1990; Kiewiet and Rivers, 
1985; Fair, 1978; Tufte, 1978). We will use more rigorous testing to decipher the relationship 
between economic anxiety and support for Donald Trump.
Given the explicit racial appeals of Trump’s campaign, it is no surprise to find that his sup-
porters have distinct attitudes when it comes to stereotypes and discrimination. Carmines et al. 
(2011) alert us to the errors in assuming that racial stereotypes and racial resentment measure 
the same concept. As a result, we believe it is essential to know whether Trump supporters hold 
prejudicial attitudes. We looked at three categories of questions to gauge the level of stereotypi-
cal and prejudicial attitudes of Trump supporters: how much discrimination do groups face, 
which groups are lazy, and which groups are violent. The results from these questions can be 
found in Table 2. Questions asking respondents if groups are violent and lazy are comprised 
of ordinal scales that range from 1 to 7. Responses indicating a 5, 6, or 7 on the violence scale 
have been placed in the violent category. Similarly, those who indicated a 5, 6, or 7 on the lazy 
scale have been placed in the lazy scale. The left column shows the percentage of Trump sup-
porters who give that response.
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Table 2. Trump Supporters and Racial Prejudice
Blacks are violent?
Black are lazy?
Blacks face no discrimination at all.
Hispanics are violent?
Hispanics are lazy?
Hispanics face no discrimination at all.
Muslims are violent?
Muslims face no discrimination at all.
Whites are violent?
Whites are lazy?
Whites face no discrimination at all.
Whites face a lot of discrimination.
Women face no discrimination at all.
Gays and Lesbians face no discrimination at all.
Men face no discrimination at all.
Men face a lot of discrimination.
Racial Resentment mean



















Note: The t-test calculated using the Levene’s Test for Equal Variances indicated that the two racial resentment means were 
statistically different from each other with p<.001.
According to Table 2, it is clear that Trump supporters are more likely to have negative 
beliefs about Blacks, Hispanics, Muslims, and women, yet they are more likely to have positive 
feelings about Whites and men. When claiming various groups are violent, Trump supporters 
are more likely to have this negative evaluation. According to them, Blacks are most likely to 
be violent, with 76 percent of the people who agree with that statement supporting Trump. 
Feelings about Muslims are a close second, with 67 percent of those who agree that Muslims 
are violent supporting Trump, but surprisingly, only 50 percent of those who say Hispanics are 
violent support Trump. We notice very different attitudes when asking about Whites. Trump 
supporters make up only 13 percent of those who say Whites are violent. According to Table 2, 
beliefs about the laziness of groups show a similar pattern. Of those who say Blacks are lazy, al-
most two-thirds (62%) supported Trump in the 2016 election, and 51 percent of respondents 
who say Hispanics are lazy supported Trump. Compare this to the 30 percent of those who 
judge Whites to be violent and supported Trump. There is an unmistakable difference between 
Trump voters and those who supported other candidates. Tuch and Hughes conclude that 
racial resentment helps explain “Whites’ continued reluctance to support meaningful racial 
policy change” (2011, 159). Donald Trump likely tapped into the lingering beliefs about race 
that have been a historical artifact of how the American electorate evaluates Black people and 
the policies directed at Black people. 
Questions about discrimination can often unveil the various beliefs people have that shed 
light on why they might make their respective political decisions to alleviate discrimination. 
According to Table 2 above, people who believe Blacks, Hispanics, Muslims, women, gays, and 
lesbians face no discrimination are more likely to support Donald Trump. An astounding 83 
percent of those who say women face no discrimination, 78 percent who say gays and lesbians 
face no discrimination, 76 percent who say Blacks face no discrimination, 74 percent who say 
Hispanics face no discrimination, and 72 percent who say Muslims face no discrimination also 
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said they were supporting Trump. This means that although there have been numerous reports 
of the discrimination against these groups, Trump supporters believe this discrimination is 
fictional. Moreover, when respondents say Whites or men face a lot of discrimination, they 
are more likely to be Trump supporters, 70 percent and 58 percent respectively. It is clear that 
Trump supporters have a view that men and Whites are being marginalized in the current po-
litical climate, while the traditionally and documented marginalized groups are seen as having 
a level playing field. For Trump supporters, it might make more political sense to find ways to 
create a level playing field for White men, rather than making the country less discriminatory.
Racial resentment is another distinct way of gauging the attitudes people have regard-
ing Blacks in the United States (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). All of the above indicators show 
Trump supporters have some of the most prejudicial attitudes regarding Black people. The 
racial resentment measure is made up of four questions: Blacks should try harder; Blacks get 
less than they deserve; the past slavery makes life harder for Blacks; and Blacks should work 
their way up. The racial resentment scale was created by taking the responses of the above ques-
tions and recoding them in a way that lower scores mean the respondent has the least racially 
resentful attitudes, while higher scores mean the respondents are the most racially resentful. 
Each new measure of racial resentment includes four different response options, ranging from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. The middle category, indicating the respondent neither 
agreed nor disagreed with the statement, was not included in this new measure. These four 
variables were then compiled to create one variable for each respondent. Respondents could 
earn a score ranging from a 4 (if they have the least racially resentful response to all four mea-
sures) to a 16 (if they have the most racially resentful response to all measures). As displayed 
in Table 2, the mean resentment score for respondents who did not support Donald Trump is 
8.06. In contrast, the mean for Trump supporters is 13.49. There is a clear difference between 
the resentment Trump supporters have and that of the rest of the country. 
The reality of Trump supporters is that they display some of the traditional attributes of 
those who vote for Republican candidates: they are Republican and conservative. At the same 
time, those who supported candidate Trump added a level of complexity that could not be 
predicted: on the surface, they are not better off financially, they hold attitudes that display 
racial prejudice, and they have racial resentment. 
Model
Since our dependent variable is dichotomous, we are limited by the methods available for 
testing the effects of racial resentment and economic anxiety on voting for Donald Trump. We 
use logistic regression to explain the White vote for Donald Trump, therefore limiting our cases 
to White respondents. The following is our model.
Trump Vote=b+b1 Racial Resentment + b2 individual employment outlook + b3 national eco-
nomic outlook + b4 Partisanship + b5 income +b6 education + b7 Gender
Variables
The dependent variable for this analysis is the presidential vote choice coded as (1=Trump, 
0=Other Candidates). We are interested in explaining White support for Trump, so support 
for any other candidate is in one category. This means our results are not appropriate for a 
16 Economic Anxiety or Racial Predispositions?
discussion of support for Hillary Clinton. 
Two attitudinal concepts are at the heart of our work: racial resentment and economic 
anxiety.  Using the measures created by Kinder and Sanders (1996), four response items taken 
from the ANES operationalize our measure of racial resentment. Respondents are asked to 
agree or disagree with the following questions:
Denial of Continued Discrimination
• Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it dif-
ficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 
Blacks Should Try Harder
• It’s really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only 
try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.
Blacks Should Work Way Up
• Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their 
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
Undeserved Advantages
• Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
Since all of these questions measure the same concept, as with previous research we cre-
ated one scale that measures racial resentment (Peterson and Riley, 2017). The racial resent-
ment scale was created by taking the responses to the above questions and recoding them in a 
way such that lower scores mean the respondent has the least racially resentful attitudes while 
higher scores mean the respondents are the most racially resentful. As indicated above, the 
respondents’ scores range from 4 to 16. They earn a 4 if they give the least racially resentful 
response to all four measures, and a 16 if they provide the most racially resentful response to 
all measures. 
Our second concept of interest measures the respondent’s economic anxiety. We measure 
the economic anxiety in two ways, economic anxiety regarding unemployment and economic 
anxiety regarding the national economy. Interviewers asked two questions that we found espe-
cially important for measuring economic anxiety. One question asked about the individual’s 
perception of unemployment, while the other asked about perceptions of the national econo-
my. More specifically, respondents were asked if they thought unemployment would be better 
or worse in the future and whether they thought the economy would be better or worse in the 
next twelve months. When referring to expectations about future unemployment, the respon-
dents’ answers were recorded as: there would be more unemployment, the same unemploy-
ment, or less unemployment in the future.
Similarly, respondents could answer that they expected the national economy to be better, 
the same, or worse in the next twelve months. These measures are consistent with the research 
of scholars such as Kinder and Kiewit (1981), which suggests that it is important to under-
stand how respondents feel about the national economy. These feelings about the national 
economy, whether accurate or not, may drive political decisions.
Similar to previous research, we control for several variables. The first control variable is 
partisanship. Since the research of Campbell et al. (1960) there has been an unmistakable im-
pact of partisanship on how people vote. Our variable measures the respondent’s identification 
as a Democrat, Independent, or Republican with higher numbers indicating identification 
with the Republican Party. To address gender, we created a dummy variable which measures 
whether the respondent self-identified as female: a value of 0 indicates male, and a value of 1 
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indicates female. Although Kaufman’s work (2006) suggests the gender gap may be declining, 
others such as Norrander and Wilcox (2008) argue the gender gap has become more complex, 
with a diversity emerging among women. Scholars such as Brooks and Brady (1999) find that 
family income influences how voters make their decisions, so we use family income as another 
control variable. Finally, we control for education, coded with higher numbers meaning more 
education.
ANALYSIS
Table 3. Explaining Support for Donald Trump
Variable B (SE) Wald Test Probability
Racial Resentment
Racial resentment scale .262*** (.069) 14.404 .000
Economic Variables
Unemployment anxiety -.729* (.378) 3.727 .054
Future economy anxiety -.063 (.323) .038 .845
Control Variables
Income .015 (.028) .267 .605
Education -.216** (.095) 5.166 .023
Partisanship .887*** (.130) 46.484 .000
Gender -.053 (.426) .015 .902
Constant -2.390*** (1.697) 1.983 .159
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2=.74
N=272
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Predicted probabilities calculated for each significant variable, not shown above. The 
Wald column shows the Wald statistic which tests whether the parameter value is equal to zero. *p < .10., **p < .05., ***p 
<.01
Table 3 displays the logistic regression output for our hypotheses. The table includes the 
independent and control variables with the calculated parameter (B) and standard error values. 
The Wald statistic and probability values are listed in the third and fourth columns. These 
values tell whether the parameter value is different from zero. Unlike the parameter values with 
ordinary least squares, the parameter estimates (B) in logistic regression cannot be easily inter-
preted, therefore predicted probabilities are calculated to estimate the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. The positive B value for racial resentment supports the 
first hypothesis that higher levels of racial resentment lead to more support for Donald Trump. 
Figure 1, where the predicted probability of support for Donald Trump is plotted along the 
vertical axis, and racial resentment is plotted along the horizontal axis, is a visual representation 
of the ability of racial resentment to predict support for Donald Trump.
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Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Those with Racial Resentment Supporting Trump
Although there is less than a .19 probability that someone who gets a 4 on the racial resent-
ment scale will support Trump, those with a 16 have a probability of about .85. In fact, when 
a respondent earns a 10 on the racial resentment scale there is more than a .50 probability that 
they will support Donald Trump. Those with the highest racial resentment score have a .85 
probability of supporting Donald Trump. That is an extremely high probability of supporting 
Trump. This figure is a striking representation of the relationship between racial resentment 
and support for Trump, supporting our first hypothesis that respondents with higher levels of 
racial resentment are more likely to support Trump. 
When comparing racial resentment to the economic anxiety measures, a more complex 
picture emerges. The first economic variable measuring economic anxiety—perception about 
the future economy of the nation—is not significant in the model. Although it seems to be 
in the right direction, with the negative value suggesting that respondents who perceive the 
economy will be worse in the future are more likely to support Donald Trump, we cannot 
make that claim because the variable failed to reach significance. Any speculation about the 
influence of this variable cannot be supported with this model. On the other hand, unemploy-
ment anxiety is a significant predictor of Trump support in this model. The direction of the 
relationship is as expected: those who believe unemployment will be worse in the future are 
more likely to support Trump, indicated by the negative B value in Table 3. The predicted 
probabilities reflect this relationship with about a 34-point difference between those who say 
unemployment will be worse and those who say it will be better, .42 versus .76 probability of 
supporting Trump (see Table 4). Even when people believe unemployment will be better in 
the future, there is a .42 probability that they will support Trump, a difference of .34 between 
the extremes of those who think the unemployment will be better in the future and those who 
believe it will be worse. This is certainly much less than the .65 difference between the racial 
resentment extremes. Again those with the highest resentment have a .84 probability of sup-
porting Trump, while those with economic anxiety have a .76 probability. This finding sup-
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ports our second hypothesis, that racial resentment is a greater determinant of Trump support 
than a respondent’s economic anxiety.
Table 4. Predicted Probabilities


















 Partisanship and education are also significant variables in the model. The negative B 
values indicate that respondents with less formal education are more likely to support Trump. 
Similarly, as one would expect given the impact of partisanship, Republicans are more likely to 
support Trump. Gender is not a significant variable in the logistic regression model.
CONCLUSION
  This study set out to investigate whether White support for Donald Trump in the 
2016 presidential election was driven by racial resentment or economic anxiety? Although 
political scientists have devoted significant attention to the rise of racial resentment during the 
Obama era, we still know very little about how racial attitudes might continue to polarize mass 
public opinion in a post-Obama America. This analysis presents one of the first empirical tests 
that demonstrate the spillover effects of racial attitudes into the 2016 presidential election. Us-
ing a representative sample of White respondents from the 2016 American National Elections 
Survey, we relied on a logistic regression model to answer our research question. Our findings 
indicate that racial resentment was a significant predictor of vote choice for Donald Trump and 
those respondents who indicated support for Donald Trump held many stereotypical views 
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about racial and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the findings show that racial resentment was 
a far stronger predictor of White support for Trump than economic variables. 
The findings presented in this work hold important implications for scholars examining 
the influence of racial attitudes on vote choice. Recent studies examining racial attitudes dur-
ing the Obama years have analyzed the spillover effects of racial attitudes into mass public 
opinion and have asked if these attitudes will impact American politics after the Obama era 
(Tesler, 2015; Knuckey, 2011; Tesler, 2012b; Maxwell et al., 2013; Wilson and King-Meadows, 
2016). The findings of this article provide one of the first answers to this question. It appears 
that racial attitudes did in fact spillover into the 2016 presidential election and were a strong 
predictor of White support for Donald Trump. These finding also maintain essential implica-
tions for scholars studying racial appeals. One of the most important implications of this study 
is that the study challenges the assertion that Donald Trump’s electoral success was solely tied 
to concerns about the economy. Our findings indicate that while racial resentment is a far 
greater predictor of White support for Donald Trump, one of our proxies for economic anxi-
ety is also a statistically significant predictor of White support. What scholars know about the 
psychological impacts of anxiety makes it likely that racial resentment and economic anxiety 
may be reinforcing each other. Several factors make this possible; for example, we know that 
anxiety diverts cognitive functioning to threatening stimuli, activates stereotypes, and elicits 
anger. Given the racial appeals of Donald Trump during the campaign and a political environ-
ment that had been primed for racial resentment during the Obama presidency, it is possible 
that White voters’ anxiety about the economy became racialized. At the very heart of the racial 
resentment model are attitudes about economic resources. If, as the literature suggests, anxi-
ety diverts attention to threatening stimuli and activates stereotypes, that would explain why 
Trump supporters hold negative racial stereotypes about racial and ethnic minorities. In this 
view, racial and ethnic minorities are a direct threat to the economic status and future prospects 
of Whites. Still, our findings indicate that even when controlling for economic anxiety, racial 
resentment is a stronger predictor of the White vote in 2016, suggesting that White support 
for Trump is inherently linked to negative racial predisposition. 
Although we find considerable support for our hypothesis, it is important to discuss the 
limitations of our study. The first limitation concerns the sample size. Although the ANES 
data contains a large sample of White respondents, several respondents did not answer specific 
questions and as a result were dropped out of the regression model. Having a larger sample of 
Whites would undoubtedly increase both the strength and predictability of our model. A sec-
ond limitation concerns conceptualizing economic anxiety. While we find economic concerns 
about the future economy drive White support for Trump, we recognize a need for more ro-
bust measures of economic anxiety. For example, the development of an economic anxiety in-
dex may help scholars gauge a better understanding of how respondents evaluate the economy. 
Academic scholarship must also be clear in how economic hardship and economic anxiety are 
different. Future scholarship must create measures that rely on aggregate and individual-level 
data to investigate the role that financial well-being has on how people make voting decisions. 
Because we are using data from ANES we are restricted to the questions asked in the survey. 
A final limitation of our study is that we are unable to draw inferences about the attitudes of 
respondents who may have supported Hillary Clinton. 
Finally, we agree with Ronald M. Walters (2003) that White Nationalism has taken root as 
the equilibrium of mainstream American politics. Moreover, we believe the election of Barack 
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Obama violated the racial equilibrium, causing the 2016 election to call for a return to White 
Nationalism. This new White Nationalism was bold enough to emerge in the explicit and im-
plicit appeals of candidate Donald Trump as an appeal to both old-fashioned and new racism. 
Although many refuse to acknowledge the influence of White Nationalism in how Whites 
made their decision at the voting booth, our work unequivocally shows that racial resentment 
was not detached from their political decision. Future work should continue the exploration of 
what this equilibrium will look like during and subsequent to the Trump presidency. 
NOTES
1Note: There are a total of 28 categories for income ranging from under $5000 to over $250,000. The mean for 
Trump supporters is $55,000–$59,999, and the mean for all respondents is $50,000–$54,999. The t-test calculated 
using the Levene’s Test for Equal Variances indicated that the two means were not statistically different from each 
other with t =-.289 and probability =.773.
2Although racial resentment is a standard measure of White racial attitudes it has not come without criticism. 
Scholars have questioned its validity and whether it is a manifestation of racism and not just merely conservatism. 
Despite this criticism, many of the studies challenging the racial resentment model have been rebutted, and scholars 
have found the conceptualization of racial resentment to be empirically valid. The work of Tarman and Sears (2005) 
has led the way in defending the use of racial resentment measures. Racial Resentment has also been criticized by 
scholars citing that it has a strong association with White racial policy preferences only because the items used to 
capture both concepts are similar in content. The major questions concerning critics of racial resentment centers 
around the question, is racial resentment a “distinctive and independent belief system or is it merely redundant with 
older concepts that have traditionally been used to explain racial attitudes, such as political conservatism, old fash-
ion racism, individualism, or anti-egalitarianism?” The empirical test does not support this critique; in fact, Tarman 
and Sears find that in both the 1986 and 2000 NES data, the items used to measure racial resentment are due to a 
factor other than ideology and party identification. 
3Because the more recent literature underscores the ideological realignment, we do not include ideology in the 
model. We opted to include partisanship instead of ideology.  
4The predicted probabilities were calculated using SPSS. The parameter values and means for each of the variables 
were inserted into the regression equation, while the predicted value of the variable of interest was calculated using 
the following equation predicted probability=Exp(Constant + X1b1+ X2b2+ X3b3++ X4b4+ X5b5+ X6b6+ + X7b7) 
/(1+ Exp(Constant + X1b1+ X2b2 + X3b3+ X4b4+ X5b5+ X6b6+ + X7b7)). 
5See Table 4 for Table of Predicted Probabilities. 
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